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Abstract
In this paper, two firms play an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game, and each firm has
an agent who produces the firm’s output and holds private information about production
costs. The colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents’
information. We develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents
as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information. We
show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market-
allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric.
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1 Introduction
Collusion in practice is often characterized by price-fixing and market-share allocation.1 Together
with studies of actual price-fixing cases, recent literature has shed light on diverse aspects of
collusion. One of these aspects is that firms’ production costs are regarded as private information.
Aoyagi (2003), Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008), Athey et al. (2004), Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn
(2004) and others develop theoretical models of this kind, where firms play a repeated Bertrand
pricing game or repeated procurement auctions. In his study of international price-fixing cartels,
Connor (2008) reports that, although participants of the lysine cartel were intensely curious about
rivals’ production costs, some uncertainty remained throughout the cartel. The uncertainty on
rivals’ costs stemmed from the use of diﬀerent manufacturing processes and plant designs, and
from the confusion or intentional obfuscation with diﬀerent cost concepts (Connor, 2008, p. 206).
Beyond an agreement on price and market share, collusion often includes a “mechanism”
through which the agreement is implemented. Communication among firms has long been recog-
nized to be an important component.2 In the presence of private information, however, truthful
communication may not occur: information on production costs belongs to an internal account-
ing system and thus can be distorted while being delivered to rival firms. Indeed, Connor (2008)
observes that members of the lysine cartel exaggerated how low their costs were in their meet-
ings. In a similar vein, recent collusion models are typically based on an environment where firms
not only hold their private information but also take control of it; thus, they can easily distort
private information for their own interests. Given this characteristic of information, collusive
agreements face a problem with providing “truth-telling” incentives for firms. This may limit
the extent to which firms can benefit from communication.
Observing the sugar-refining cartel, however, Genesove and Mullin (1999) report that, while a
firm’s internal information was not perfectly observed by outsiders, other factors made it diﬃcult
to distort information. They argue that “it may be too diﬃcult to construct a credible, systematic
lie, since a variety of bits of information, both internal and external to the firm, have to be made
consistent with any false report” (Genesove and Mullin, 1999, p. 109).3 It has also been widely
observed in many cartels that members develop sophisticated organizational structures that allow
various levels of employees (executive and middle management) to communicate across firms.4
The sophistication of cartel structures may constrain the degree to which firms can consistently
1Whinston (2006) surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on price-fixing collusions, while Harrington
(2006) and Connor (2008) study patterns of price fixing and market allocation in actual cartels.
2 It has been commonly observed in many cartels that participants often hold meetings to allocate market shares
and to monitor whether the agreed-upon market shares are realized. See, e.g., Harrington (2006).
3Connor (2008) also observes that at times, some cartel members appeared to be well-informed about their
rivals’ costs through consultants or experts who had close ties with their rivals’ operations, and that a cartel
member provided factory tours for its rivals in order to convince them of its low production costs.
4Harrington (2006) summarizes the organizational structures observed in many cartels. Levenstein and Suslow
(2006) find a positive relationship between sophisticated organizational structures and cartel success. Observing
1
falsify private information for their own gain.
Recent studies of collusion thus raise a new and challenging question: what is the relation-
ship between the degree to which firms can distort their private information and the scope of
communicative collusion? This problem has rarely been addressed by theoretical papers despite
its important policy implications. Reducing the breadth of the question, this paper adopts the
work of Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004) as benchmarks to develop a model
of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their
incentives to distort private information. We show that such firm behavior may expand the scope
of optimal collusion whether market-allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric.
There is a two-tier relationship in our model: two firms play an infinitely-repeated Bertrand
game, and each firm has an agent who produces the firm’s output and holds private information
about production costs. The cost type is high or low and i.i.d. across agents and time. Each
agent reports its cost type to the firm. The firm then makes a cost announcement to its rival
firm, sets prices and allocates market shares. All firm actions are publicly observed as in the
benchmark models. A collusive scheme involves a two-tier revelation mechanism that induces
agents to make truthful reports and firms to make truthful announcements. There are contrasting
incentive problems in the model. At the inter-firm level, firms set high prices and allocate market
shares by the criterion of productive eﬃciency, whereby all production is assigned to the agent(s)
with the lowest production costs. Thus, a high-cost firm that has received a report of high cost
has an incentive to understate the reported cost type and announce low cost in the hope of
increasing its market share. At the intra-firm level, a low-cost agent who has observed low cost
has an incentive to overstate the observed cost type and report high cost in the hope of receiving
greater transfer payments for a given level of production.5
We establish two diﬀerent classes of equilibria, asymmetric and symmetric Perfect Public
Equilibrium (PPE), wherein firms’ payoﬀs have two components, current-period profits and
(discounted) continuation values, and after any history, the set of continuation values is equal
to the equilibrium-value set. In particular, we characterize the two equilibria in which firms use
continuation-value transfers for their truthful communication.6 We first analyze asymmetric PPE
(APPE) and construct an APPE-value set in which, to prevent a high-cost firm from understating
the diamond cartel, Spar (1994) argues that cartels constitute more than the external interaction among firms;
the internal characteristics of cartel participants, such as the level of organizational commitment, can also aﬀect their
capacity to engage in external cooperation.
5A classic evidence on agent’s overstating behavior is Schiﬀ and Lewin’s (1970) observation that managers create
slack in their budgets by overstating costs. More recent evidence on budgetary slack includes Merchant (1985)
and Merchant and Manzoni (1989). A similar incentive problem is widely found in the mechanism design literature
(e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) and in the extensive “transfer pricing” literature.
6Continuation values play the role of side-payments in models of legalized cartels: communication helps firms
to identify the most eﬃcient firm, while side-payments provide firms with truth-telling incentives (e.g., Roberts, 1985;
Cramton and Palfrey, 1990; Kihlstrom and Vives, 1992). Our analysis, in its relation to procurement auctions,
may describe the case in which (i) two collusive bidders play a knockout auction, prior to actual bidding, to
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its cost type, a high continuation value (as future reward) is aﬀorded to the firm that announces
high cost today.7 We argue that the above contrasting incentives work to the colluding firms’
advantage. Consider first the eﬀect of market-allocation scheme on internal contract. If firms
coordinate to allocate market shares based on productive eﬃciency, then a low-cost agent who
reports high cost will be paid nothing (because of no production) when the other firm announces
low cost. This scheme softens the low-cost agent’s incentive to overstate the observed cost type
and thus reduces the information rents for the agent. Consider next the eﬀect of internal contract
on market-allocation scheme. If an internal contract specifies that a high-cost agent receives a
large payment when the agent produces more than a predetermined level of output, then the
contract softens the high-cost firm’s current-period incentive to understate the reported cost type
and thus reduces the corresponding continuation-value (future) reward.
We construct the Pareto frontier of APPE values. The frontier is depicted as a line segment
when continuation-value transfers entail no eﬃciency loss in prices and market-share allocations.
The frontier can be established only when the line segment is suﬃciently long, so that a high-cost
firm is persuaded to be truthful today by a suﬃciently high continuation value drawn within the
segment, even if the firm may end up with zero market share. Firms use the internal contract
to constrain the degree to which a high-cost firm can gain from falsifying its agent’s report.
As argued above, such a contractual arrangement reduces the continuation-value reward that is
necessary to prevent the high-cost firms’ understatement today. This relaxes the constraint that
the segment must be suﬃciently long. In this way, the internal contract acts as a commitment
device that elicits truthfulness from firms.
Our analysis of APPE, building on the “no-agent” model by Athey and Bagwell (2001), has
distinct features. In their paper, firms take control of private information, and can distort it at
no extra costs. In our model, the presence of agents is used by firms as a strategic opportunity
to restrict their incentives to distort private information. We find that such firm behavior may
expand the scope of optimal collusion: a simple contractual arrangement makes it possible to
establish a suﬃciently long Pareto frontier of APPE values so that truthful communication is
ensured by continuation-value transfers within the frontier. As a result, firms benefit from the
interaction between the contractual and market-sharing arrangement: (i) a contractual arrange-
find who will be a lowest-cost supplier (e.g., McAfee and McMillan, 1992), and (ii) each bidder suﬀers some costs
of distorting information, were it to lie. The role of communication also emerges in the information-sharing literature,
where it is often assumed that firms can precommit to share verifiable information. Without the assumption
of commitment and verifiability, Ziv (1993) shows that firms can share information truthfully when they exchange
transfer payments. For surveys of the literature, see Kühn and Vives (1995) and Vives (1999).
7 In practice, the cartels prosecuted by the U.S. Antitrust Division were found to use rather sophisticated schemes.
For instance, many cartels used “future markets” as a channel of exchanging direct side-payments. They used
a compensation scheme, whereby any firm that had sold more than its allotted share was required in the following
budget period to purchase the excess from an underbudget firm that had not reached its allocation target in
the preceding period (Business Week, July 27, 1998).
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ment with agents is used to restrict the firms’ gain from understatement and achieve productive
eﬃciency in market-share allocations, and (ii) productive eﬃciency is reversely transmitted to
restrict the agents’ gain from overstatement and reduce the information rents for agents.
We next analyze symmetric PPE (SPPE) and establish an SPPE-value set. In SPPE, prices
and market-share allocations are symmetric across firms for all histories. The corresponding
value set is restricted to the 45-degree line, which reduces the Pareto frontier of SPPE values to
a point, not a line segment. Then, continuation-value transfers entail some waste of continuation
values for both firms, which will be delivered in the form of eﬃciency loss in prices or market-share
allocations in the future.
We construct an SPPE in which, to prevent a high-cost firm from understating its cost type
today, a low continuation value (as future penalty) is given to both firms after a pair of low-cost
announcements. Firms use the contractual arrangement to restrict the high-cost firm’s gain from
understatement today. This, in turn, reduces the level of the future penalty that is necessary
to prevent the high-cost firm’s understatement today. We find that such firm behavior may
oﬀset the potential disadvantage of the symmetry restriction and expand the scope of optimal
collusion. In the no-agent model, continuation-value transfers are always wasteful and optimal
SPPE values fall short of the Pareto frontier of APPE values. In our model, the SPPE-value
set can be shortened to decrease the waste of continuation-value transfers and approach a point
in the Pareto frontier of APPE values.8 To approximate the frontier, SPPE requires a stronger
commitment device than APPE to restrict the gain from understatement, since firms in SPPE
are more willing to opt for understatement today, having no continuation-value reward.
We finally discuss some extensions of the model. In the first extension, we assume that
firms can observe their agents’ cost types at no informational costs: a firm’s production costs
are privately observed by the firm and its agent. Our model is then seemingly closer to the
model of Athey and Bagwell (2001) than before. We show, however, that this extension serves
to strengthen the main result: firms may be able to expand the scope of optimal collusion by
using the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to lengthen the frontier of APPE values
and shorten the SPPE-value set. In the second extension, we suppose that communication is
not allowed, and show that the impact of non-communication on equilibrium values may be
arbitrarily small in the Bertrand model; small diﬀerences in prices across states can mimic the
role of communication that allocates state-contingent market shares and continuation values. In
the last extension, we present a possibility that firms can coordinate to reduce agents’ information
rents if they have a repeated contractual relationship with their agents.
In broad terms, the contractual arrangement in our paper represents a “public device” that
firms can use to endogenize the degree to which they can take control of private information. Our
analysis implies that an equilibrium-value set may be tailored by such a public device whether
market-allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric. A variety of strategic contracting
8Again, firms benefit from the above interaction between the contractual and market-sharing arrangement.
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devices have been highlighted by the literature.9 There is a broad analogy between our analysis
and the work of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Fershtman et al. (1991) in the sense that
firms in their models have managers and use the contract with their managers as a strategic
opportunity to compete or collude more eﬀectively in a Cournot oligopoly game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and
describes the approach we use. Section 3 describes the constraints that equilibrium strategies
must satisfy. Section 4 characterizes an APPE, where firm strategies are unrestricted. Section
5 describes an SPPE, where firm strategies are restricted to be symmetric. Section 6 discusses
extensions of the model. Section 7 provides conclusions.
2 TheModel
There are two ex ante identical firms. Each firm has an agent who produces the firm’s output
and holds private information about production costs. In each period, the agents’ cost types are
independently drawn from an identical common-knowledge distribution with discrete support
{θL, θH} which is indexed by {L,H}. The state space in each period is {L,H} × {L,H}, and a
typical state is denoted by (j, k) ∈ {(L,L), (L,H), (H,L), (H,H)}. A cost type θL (θH) is drawn
with probability μ (probability 1− μ). While cost types are privately observed by agents, prices
and quantities are publicly observed. To analyze how the presence of agents aﬀects a commonly
observed collusive behavior, price-fixing with market-share allocation, we assume that in each
period, demand is inelastic, and there is a unit mass of homogeneous consumers with a reservation
price ρ, where ρ > θH . This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis, since the problem of
finding an optimal collusion can be reduced to that of finding market-share allocations, given
that patient firms will not undercut the optimal fixed price ρ.10
2.1 Optimal Monopoly Profit
In this subsection, we consider a monopolist who oﬀers a contract to two privately-informed
agents. We will show later that patient firms can replicate the monopolist’s optimal behavior.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) agent i ∈ {1, 2} privately observes its cost type θi ∈
{L,H}, (ii) the monopolist oﬀers a single-period contract to its agents, (iii) agent i makes a
report ri ∈ {L,H} to the firm and (iv) agent i produces the quantity qi and the contracts are
9Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Katz (1991), Reitman (1993), Sklivas (1987), Spagnolo (2000),
and Kockesen and Ok (2004) show that contracts with delegated agents can serve as a strategic commitment device.
10The assumption excludes the possibility that firms segment the whole market and charge diﬀerent prices across
the segmented markets. As in Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008), however, the assumption allows us to analyze
the extent to which firms can benefit from communication; given the fixed price, firms can communicate and
allocate market shares unequally among themselves. Harrington (2006) observes that actual cartels often use
a “target” price and a “floor” price. He conjectures that the target price might be the price at which members
sell their agreed-upon quantities while a price below the floor price might be considered a deviation.
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enforced.
The quantity produced by agent i is conditional on the agents’ reports, qi : {L,H}×{L,H}→
Q, where Q ≡ [0, 1]. The contract for agent i is a pair,
©
ti, qi
ª
, where ti is the payment for agent
i. A type-θj agent has utility ti − θjqi if the agent produces qi and receives ti, and any type of
agent gets zero utility if the agent refuses the contract. Let tijk and q
i
jk represent the transfer
for agent i in state (j, k) and the quantity produced by agent i in (j, k), respectively. Letting
μL ≡ μ and μH ≡ 1− μ, the expected quantities are
q1j ≡
X
k∈{L,H}
μkq
1
jk and q
2
k ≡
X
j∈{L,H}
μjq
2
jk. (1)
The optimal price is fixed, pjk = ρ ∀(j, k). The monopolist’s problem is to find the contract
{(t1jk, q1jk), (t2jk, q2jk)} that maximizes the expected profitX
j∈{L,H}
X
k∈{L,H}
μjμk
£
ρ · (q1jk + q2jk)− t1jk − t2jk
¤
(2)
subject to: for agent 1, ∀k ∈ {L,H},
t1Lk − θLq1Lk ≥ t1Hk − θLq1Hk (IC1Lk)
t1Hk − θHq1Hk ≥ t1Lk − θHq1Lk (IC1Hk)X
k∈{L,H}
μk
¡
t1Lk − θLq1Lk
¢
≥ 0 (IR1L)X
k∈{L,H}
μk
¡
t1Hk − θHq1Hk
¢
≥ 0 (IR1H)
and for agent 2, IC2jL, IC
2
jH , IR
2
L and IR
2
H .
Note that the optimal contract is derived within the set of dominant-strategy implementations.
In this setting, the contract can be equivalently implemented in Bayesian or in dominant strategy
if the expected output decreases in cost type (qiL > q
i
H), which is satisfied in the solution.
11
Optimality implies that constraints for agent 1 can be reduced to the binding constraints of IC1Lk
and IR1H . This is analogous for agent 2. There is some freedom in the choice of t
1
HL and t
1
HH :
many transfer schemes can satisfy these two binding constraints. One candidate scheme is for
high-cost agents to participate in all states: for agent 1, t1Hk = θHq
1
Hk and t
1
Lk = θLq
1
Lk+4· q1Hk.
The term∆ denotes the cost diﬀerential, ∆ ≡ θH−θL > 0, and4·q1Hk refers to information rents.
A production assignment for a high-cost agent i causes information rents for a low-cost agent
i, since it creates the low-cost agent’s incentive to mimic a high-cost type. For any candidate
scheme, a low-cost agent i is induced to be truthful by the expected information rents, 4 · qiH .
11The use of dominant-strategy implementations is due to Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), who show that
the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementations holds if the agents’ cost functions satisfy a
generalized single crossing property. This property trivially holds in our model.
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Plugging one of the candidates into the objective function, we can show that the monopolist
finds the production-allocation scheme {(q1jk, q2jk)} that maximizesX
j∈{L,H}
X
k∈{L,H}
μjμk
£
ρ · (q1jk + q2jk)− Cjq1jk − Ckq2jk
¤
, (3)
where CL ≡ θL and CH ≡ θH + μ1−μ4 reflect the virtual production costs of low- and high-cost
agents. Production by high-cost agents incurs CH > θH because of the information rents for
low-cost agents it causes.
The solution satisfies (i) q1LH = q
2
HL = 1, (ii) q
1
LL + q
2
LL = 1 and (iii) q
1
HH + q
2
HH = 1 if
ρ ≥ CH , and q1HH + q2HH = 0 otherwise. We say that productive eﬃciency is achieved if the
three conditions hold. Production is assigned only to low-cost agent(s) except for state (H,H).
Information rents for low-cost agents thus occur only when production in (H,H) is profitable,
ρ ≥ CH . The (ex ante) expected production costs are then [1− (1−μ)2]θL+(1−μ)2CH = E(θ)
if ρ ≥ CH , and [1 − (1− μ)2]θL otherwise. Since the (ex ante) expected information rents for
agent i are μ4 · qiH , the overall expected information rents are μ(1− μ)4 · (q1HH + q2HH) where
μ(1− μ)4 = (1− μ)2(CH − θH).
Lemma 1. The optimal monopoly profit is
πm ≡
½
ρ−E(θ) if ρ ≥ CH
[1− (1− μ)2](ρ− θL) otherwise.
(4)
Lemma 1 is founded on some assumptions.12 First, there is no side-contracting collusion
between agents.13 Second, the firm can commit to the ex ante production schedules. Under
ρ < CH , production in (H,H) is too costly because of the information rents it causes. Without
commitment, however, the firm might be tempted to produce after the agents’ reports (H,H)
if the contract is renegotiable. In the repeated game below, any production schedule will be
enforced as a collusive agreement, and the frontier of equilibrium values will be defined as a set:
V m ≡ {(u1, u2) : u1 + u2 = πm1−δ}, where δ is common discount factor of firms.
2.2 The Game
Our analysis hereafter is based on the following assumptions: (i) firms do not exchange side-
payments in the form of monetary transfers across firms, (ii) agents across firms do not form a
cartel to make collusive reports using their side-payments and (iii) no firm secretly renegotiates
12 If the firm can observe the agents’ cost types, it will earn first-best profit: πf = ρ− E[min(θ1, θ2)]. If ρ ≥ CH ,
then πf−πm = μ(1−μ)4 which is the overall expected information rents. If ρ < CH , then πf−πm = (1−μ)2 (ρ− θH)
which is the expected profit sacrificed in state (H,H).
13Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) characterize optimal collusion-proof mechanisms when privately-informed
agents are collusive in their side-contracting games. In related work, Che and Kim (2007) and Dequiedt (2007) study
collusion-proof mechanisms in auction.
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the contract (colludes) with its agent. The model thus addresses a stringent environment for
collusive side-contracting behaviors. In our base model, a firm i oﬀers its agent a contract
xi that lasts for only one period. The contract is selected from a set of payment schemes:
xi ∈ {eti | eti : {L,H}×Q→ R}. A typical payment for agent i is denoted by ti(qi, ri) when agent
i reports ri ∈ {L,H} and produces qi ∈ [0, 1]. We restrict attention to the contracts in which
compensations to agents are at least as high as production costs, ti(qi, j) ≥ θjqi, which ensures
that each agent produces the quantity requested by the firm. As in most of the literature that
studies strategic contractual devices, we assume that contracts are observed by firms.14
To begin with, we consider the one-shot pricing game: (i) each agent i privately observes its
cost type θi, (ii) each firm i oﬀers a contract xi to its agent, (iii) each agent i makes a report
ri to the firm, (iv) each firm i selects its price and (v) each agent i produces the quantity that
is determined by prices and the contracts are enforced. We can establish the equilibrium values
by following two steps. First, suppose each firm knows its agent’s cost type for a given contract.
A high-cost firm charges price at θH , and a low-cost firm mixes, earning the expected profit
(1− μ)4 by slightly undercutting the high-cost firm’s price. Each firm thus makes the ex ante
expected profit: μ(1 − μ)4. Second, we show that each firm i can elicit its agent’s truthful
reports by using the payment scheme: ti(qi, L) = θLqi +
(1−μ)4
2 and t
i(qi,H) = θHqi. Since
market shares in states (L,H), (H,L) and (H,H) are determined by prices, q1LH = q
2
HL = 1 and
q1HH = q
2
HH =
1
2 , a low-cost agent will make a truthful report under the expected information
rent 4 · qiH = (1−μ)42 . A high-cost agent will also make a truthful report: mimicking a low-cost
type, a high-cost agent will get the expected information rents 4 · qiH but suﬀer an increase of
the expected production cost 4·qiL. The monotonicity, qiL ≥ qiH , holds for any realization of qiLL
under the mixed prices in state (L,L). The ex ante expected information rents for each agent
are μ(1−μ)42 . Therefore, the ex ante expected profit, net of the ex ante expected information
rents, is πn ≡ μ(1−μ)42 . For the punishment phase in the repeated game below, we define the set
of Nash-equilibrium values: V n ≡ {(u1, u2) : u1 = u2 = v ≡ πn1−δ}.
We now describe the basic repeated-game model. In each period, firms play the stage game:
(i) each agent i privately observes its cost type θi, (ii) each firm i oﬀers a contract xi to each
agent, (iii) each agent i makes a report ri to the firm, (iv) each firm i makes an announcement
ai to its rival firm j 6= i, (v) each firm i chooses a price pi and makes a market-share proposal qi
and (vi) each agent i produces the quantity that is determined by the firm and the contracts are
enforced. This stage game describes an environment in which equally priced firms, subsequent
to the agents’ report, communicate and allocate market shares in a state-dependent way, and
each agent, following firms’ selection of market shares, produces the corresponding quantity.15
14A recent study of strategic delegation by Koçkesen and Ok (2004) shows that even unobservable contracts
may serve as a commitment device.
15The firms’ cost announcements and price and market-share proposals are not specified in the one-shot game above,
where market shares are determined solely by prices.
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Market share for firm i, mi, is determined by the vectors, p ≡ (p1, p2) and q ≡ (q1, q2). If pi > ρ,
then mi = 0, and if pi < pj ≤ ρ, then mi = 1. If p1 = p2 ≤ ρ, then mi = 12 if q1 + q2 6= 1,
and mi = qi otherwise. The firms’ cost announcements and market-share proposals matter only
when prices are equal; if prices are diﬀerent, then market shares are determined solely by prices.
To simplify the exposition, we define firm strategies for a given internal contract xi. In the
interim stage that follows the agent’s report ri, firm i has a finite strategy set:
Si =
©eai | eai : {L,H}→ {L,H}ª× ©epi | epi : {L,H}3 → Rª× ©eqi | eqi : {L,H}3 → Qª . (5)
Announcement function, eai, is conditional on the agent i’s report. Pricing and market-share
functions, epi and eqi, are conditional on the agent i’s report and both firms’ announcements.16 A
typical stage-game strategy for firm i is
si
¡
ri, ai, aj
¢
≡
¡eai ¡ri¢ , epi ¡ri, ai, aj¢ , eqi ¡ri, ai, aj¢¢ . (6)
A strategy vector is written as s(r) ≡ (s1(r1, a1, a2), s2(r2, a1, a2)), given the agents’ reports
r ≡ (r1, r2). A vector s provides an interim stage-game payoﬀ, Πi(s) = Erj
£
πi(s(r), ri)
¤
, where
πi(s(r), ri) represents the realized profit given the strategies. An ex ante expected stage-game
payoﬀ is Πi(s) = Eri
£
Πi(s)
¤
.
Consider next the repeated game. We establish Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE), where
firm strategies are conditional on the publicly observed history of realized choices (Fudenberg et
al., 1994). Upon entering a period, each firm publicly observes the realized choices. Each firm
also privately observes its current cost type, the history of the cost types it had and the choice
functions it used in previous periods. Thus, a firm does not observe its rival firm’s current or past
cost types and does not observe its rival firm’s current or past choice functions. Let a ≡ (a1, a2)
represent the firms’ announcement vector. Upon entering a period τ , each firm observes the
public history of realized choices, hτ = {at,pt,qt}τ−1t=1 and h1 = ∅. A strategy of firm i in period
τ , denoted by σiτ , is a mapping from the set of potential public histories Hτ to the set of stage-
game strategies Si. A strategy profile in period τ is στ ≡ (σ1τ , σ2τ ). Each history hτ provides
the per-period expected payoﬀ Πi(στ (hτ )). Each strategy involves a probability distribution and
entails the expected payoﬀ E[
P∞
τ=1 δ
τ−1Πi(στ (hτ ))].
2.3 Two-Tier Mechanism Design
In this subsection, we describe a two-tier mechanism that involves ri = θi (agent i’s truthful
report) and ai = ri (firm i’s truthful announcement). This approach follows two steps. In Step
1, we assume that each firm knows its agent’s cost type for a given contract, and establish the
16 It has not been ensured yet that agents make truthful reports (ri = θi), and firms make truthful announcements
(ai = ri). Note also that strategies hpi and hqi are defined on the space of the firm i’s announced and unannounced cost
type, as well as on the space that corresponds to the agent i’s report and firm j’s announcement.
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equilibrium-value set. In Step 2, we select a contract that elicits the agents’ truthfulness and
maximizes the equilibrium values.
In Step 1, we follow the dynamic programming tool developed by Abreu et al. (1986, 1990),
whereby a firm’s equilibrium play can be factored into two components, current-period strategies
and (discounted) expected continuation values that are conditional on current-period actions,
and after any history, the set of continuation values is equal to the equilibrium-value set. We
next adopt the work by Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004), who show that
the self-generating set (in the spirit of Abreu et al.) can be found by using the mechanism
design program: letting (p,q,v) represent the equilibrium-path vector for prices, quantities
and continuation values, the program chooses current-period strategies (p,q) conditional on
the firms’ announcements, and chooses continuation-value function v conditional on the firms’
announcements and current-period strategies (p,q). The vector z ≡ (p,q,v) satisfies feasibility
and incentive-compatibility constraints. Feasibility means that continuation values are drawn
from the equilibrium-value set. Incentive compatibility consists of two parts: the on-schedule
constraints that each firm i truthfully announces its cost type j (On-ICij) and the oﬀ-schedule
constraints that each firm i has no gains from (i) a deviation from the vector (p,q) after the
announcement (j, k) (Oﬀ-ICijk) or (ii) a misrepresentation jˆ 6= j at the announcement and a
subsequent deviation from the vector (Oﬀ-m-ICij).
17
An on-schedule deviation is not detected as a deviation by the rival firm, since it follows the
equilibrium vector, whereas an oﬀ-schedule deviation is observed. The oﬀ-schedule deviation in
(i) is realized when a firm slightly undercuts the price (say, cpjk = pijk−ε) and captures the entire
market (cqjk = 1) after the announcement (j, k). The deviation in (ii) is realized when a firm
misrepresents its type, aiming to undercut the price subsequently. For example, if the price at
the announcement (jˆ, k), pjˆk, is higher than in other announcements, then firm 1 of type j may
be tempted to announce jˆ 6= j, aiming to undercut the high price (cpjˆk = pjˆk− ε). As will be seen
below, this second deviation can be ignored at a price-fixing collusion.
We now formalize the two-tier program for later use. Suppose that, if firm 1 knows its agent’s
type j and announces jˆ, then it receives the current-period payoﬀ π1(p1jˆk, q
1
jˆk, j) and continuation
value v1jˆk when (jˆ, k) is realized in the stage game. Firm 1 then receives the interim current-period
payoﬀ and continuation value:
Π1 (jˆ, j) ≡
X
k∈{L,H}
μkπ
1(p1jˆk, q
1
jˆk, j) and v
1
jˆ ≡
X
k∈{L,H}
μkv
1
jˆk. (7)
We can write the interim-stage payoﬀ as Πi (jˆ, j) + δvijˆ and the ex ante expected payoﬀ as
ui(z) =
X
j∈{L,H}
μj
£
Πi (j, j) + δvij
¤
. (8)
17The on-schedule constraints imply that firms are truthful at the announcement along the vector z. A firm
thus lies at the announcement only for a subsequent oﬀ-schedule deviation.
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In Step 1, we assume that each firm knows its agent’s cost type, and define the set of incentive
compatible vectors z = (p,q,v), where continuation values are drawn from co(V ):
ZIC(V ) ≡
©
z : On-ICij , Oﬀ-IC
i
jk and Oﬀ-m-IC
i
j hold, and (v
1
jk, v
2
jk) ∈ co(V ) ∀i, j, (j, k)
ª
. (9)
We then adopt the work by Athey and Bagwell (2001): any PPE-value set can be established by
the vectors in (9) together with the punishment-value set.18 The set V ∪ V n is a PPE-value set
if
V =
©¡
u1, u2
¢
: ∃z ∈ ZIC(V ) such that ui = ui(z) ∀i
ª
. (10)
In Step 2, we select a contract xi that induces the agent’s truthfulness and maximizes the PPE
values; as will be seen below, the role of contract is not only a mechanism for agents’ truthful
reports but is also a strategic device for firms’ truthful communication.19
3 Incentive Compatibility with Contract
In this section, we fully describe the on- and oﬀ-schedule constraints of firms under a strate-
gic device of contract. We assume that prices are fixed at ρ, and market-share schedules are
monotone, qiL > q
i
H . These conditions will hold in the equilibrium below. Among other alter-
natives, we consider a contract: when agent 1 reports low cost and produces q1, then the agent
receives
t1
¡
q1, L
¢
= θLq1 +4 · q1H , (11)
and when agent 1 reports high cost and produces q1, then the agent receives
t1(q1,H) =
(
θHq1 if q1 = q1Hk
θHq1 + α (ρ− θH) (q1L − q1H) if q1 = q1Lk,
(12)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The contract for agent 2 is analogous. This contract has the following features.
First, the contract includes a commitment device that restricts the firm’s expected gain from
understatement; if firm i falsifies the agent’s report of high cost and announces low cost, then it
will make the expected gain (ρ− θH) (qiL− qiH) but incur an extra expense α (ρ− θH) (qiL− qiH).
The net gain from understatement decreases in α for a given market-sharing scheme. The con-
tractual arrangement as in (11) and (12) is hereafter denoted by xi(α). The level of α represents
a contractual parameter that captures how strongly firms are bounded to truthfulness by such
a contract.20 The contract is, however, very diﬃcult to enforce despite its strategic usefulness.
The first term in ti(qi, j), θjqi, is conditional on the actual quantity that agent i produces after
18See Lemma 1 in their paper.
19A further description of the two-tier mechanism design program is provided in the Appendix.
20The qualitative results would be unaﬀected by a diﬀerent commitment device, ti(qi;H) = θHqi + α, where
α > 0 if firm i lies, and zero otherwise. We also do not resort to an immediate solution, where α is a very large number,
in order to show that a contract of this nature can be easily modified to a more realistic contract in later analysis.
11
the report j, and thus is verifiable. A diﬃculty arises from the information-rent term 4· qiH and
the gain from understatement (ρ− θH) (qiL− qiH) that are not conditional on the agent’s current
cost report and associated production. We will later find an alternative contract in which the
payment to agent i is conditional only on the actual quantity qi that the agent produces. For
now, we make a very restrictive assumption under which these terms are verifiable.
Assumption 1. Each agent is able to verify both firms’ announcements and their market-
allocation schedules.
Second, the incentive constraints of agents and firms are intertwined: agents’ truthful reports
are ensured if and only if firms do not lie. If firms are truthful, then agents are truthful under
the contract. If high-cost firms falsify the agents’ report of high cost, then low-cost agents have
an incentive to overstate their cost types. If a low-cost agent i lies and reports high cost and firm
i understates it, then the agent will receive the payment specified in (12) and have the expected
net gain:
(θH − θL)qiH −4 · qiH + α (ρ− θH) (qiL − qiH) > 0. (13)
The low-cost agent who lies can get the expected cost saving in production (first term) but lose
the information rents that the agent could earn without overstatement (second term). Third,
if firms truthfully communicate and allocate market shares based on productive eﬃciency, then
they can reduce information rents by mitigating the low-cost agent’s incentive to overstate the
cost type. The overall expected information rents will be the same as in the optimal monopoly
contracting: μ4 · (q1H + q2H) = μ(1− μ)4 · (q1HH + q2HH).
We now express the incentive constraints of firms for a given contract xi(α). The current-
period profit for firm 1 is
Π1(jˆ, j) =
X
k∈{L,H}
μkπ
1
¡
ρ, q1jˆk, j
¢
=
X
k∈{L,H}
μk
£
ρq1jˆk − t1
¡
q1jˆk, j
¢¤
. (14)
The interim-stage profits are written in a direct form: U i(jˆ, j) ≡ Πi (jˆ, j) + δvijˆ.21 Then, the
on-schedule constraints are
U i(H,H) ≥ U i(L,H) (On-ICiH)
U i(L,L) ≥ U i(H,L). (On-ICiL)
Our analysis focuses on the binding downward incentive constraint (On-ICiH), based on the
following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that prices are fixed at ρ, and qiL > q
i
H . Under a contract x
i(α), if On-IC iH
is binding, then On-IC iL is slack.
21All the interim-stage profits are provided by the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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The proof is in the Appendix. Given that a high-cost firm has an incentive to mimic a low-cost
type in the hope of increasing its market share, it is assumed that On-ICiH is binding:
δ(viH − viL) = (1− α)(ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
. (15)
Firms arrange continuation-value transfers such that a high-cost firm’s understatement makes
the expected current gain (RHS) but entails the expected future loss (LHS). If a high-cost firm is
induced by continuation-value transfers to be indiﬀerent between the high and low announcement
today, then a low-cost firm strictly prefers to announce low cost and have a greater market share
today.22
We next find the expected profit when On-ICiH is binding. Under a contract x
i(α), if a
high-cost firm is truthful, then it earns
U i(H,H) = Πi(H,H) + δviH , (16)
and if a high-cost firm lies, then it earns
U i(L,H) = Πi(H,H) + (1− α)(ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
+ δviL. (17)
Given U i(H,H) = U i(L,H), we can find
U i (L,L) = U i(H,H) +4 · ¡qiL − qiH¢+ α(ρ− θH) ¡qiL − qiH¢ . (18)
The interim profit for a low-cost firm includes information rents (second term) and the extra
costs that a high-cost firm can avoid by being honest (third term). The vector (p,q,v) selected
under a contract xi(α) is denoted by z(α). If On-ICiH is binding, then the expected equilibrium
payoﬀ, ui(z(α)) =
P
j μjU
i (j, j), is given by
ui(z(α)) = (ρ− θH) qiH + δviH + μ4 ·
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
+ αμ(ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
. (19)
As mentioned above, the oﬀ-schedule constraints must be satisfied against two types of devia-
tions. As for the first deviation, no firm will undercut the price ρ and capture the entire market
after the announcement (j, k) if ∀j, k, (j, k)
δ
¡
v1jk − v
¢
≥ ρ− θj −
¡
ρq1jk − t1(q1jk, j)
¢
(Oﬀ-IC1jk)
δ
¡
v2jk − v
¢
≥ ρ− θk −
¡
ρq2jk − t2(q2jk, k)
¢
. (Oﬀ-IC2jk)
An oﬀ-schedule deviation makes the current-period gain (RHS) but incurs the future loss (LHS);
ρ − θj is the highest current-period payoﬀ that firm 1 of type j can get under any payment
scheme t1(q1, j) ≥ θjq1.23 We can also find that the second constraint, Oﬀ-m-ICij , is implied by
22As we will see below, the model finds it diﬃcult to reward a high-cost firm with continuation values because of a
potential shortness of the APPE-value set; continuation-value rewards for a high-cost firm i are thus tailored
just to make On-ICiH binding.
23 In this sense, Oﬀ-ICijk is a suﬃcient condition, not a necessary condition.
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other constraints and thus is redundant. Consider Oﬀ-m-IC1L. Firm 1 of a low-cost type has its
interim payoﬀ under xi(α):
U1(L,L) =
X
k∈{L,H}
μk
£
(ρ− θL)q1Lk + δv1Lk −4 · q1H
¤
≥
X
k∈{L,H}
μk [(ρ− θL) + δv] . (20)
The RHS represents the highest expected payoﬀ that a low-cost firm can get when it misrepresents
its cost type for a subsequent deviation. The inequality is directly implied by Oﬀ-IC1Lk.
4 Optimal APPE
In this section, we establish the existence of an optimal APPE. In regard to the existence, we
show that for a contract xi(α), there exists a value set V (α) that is generated by incentive
compatible vectors z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)):
V (α) =
©
(u1, u2) : ∃z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) such that ui = ui(z(α)) ∀i
ª
. (21)
In regard to the optimality, we choose the contract under which values in V (α) attain the optimal
monopoly values: V (α) ⊂ V m, where V m ≡ {(u1, u2) : u1 + u2 = πm1−δ}. Then, we say that there
exists a set V (α) ⊂ V m such that V (α)∪V n is a self-generating set of PPE values. For the base
model, we preserve Assumption 1 together with the assumption, μ > 12 . These assumptions will
be relaxed later.
4.1 Contractual Range
In this subsection, we show that a contractual arrangement xi(α) makes it possible to estab-
lish a suﬃciently long frontier of APPE values so that truthful communication is ensured by
continuation-value transfers within the frontier. To this end, we find a contractual form (a range
of α in (12)) under which V (α) ⊂ V m exists. The set V (α)∪V n will be an APPE-value set if for
any (u1, u2) ∈ V (α), there exists a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) such that ui = ui(z(α)) ∀i. Since
the set V (α) ⊂ V m is a line segment with slope −1, we can denote V (α) = [(u, u), (u, u)] where
u > u and u + u = π
m
1−δ . We first explore only the on-schedule constraints, assuming that firms
are suﬃciently patient so that the oﬀ-schedule constraints hold.
Consider first the parameter range ρ ≥ CH ≡ θH + μ1−μ4 in which q1HH + q2HH = 1 in an
optimal collusion, as seen in Lemma 1. It follows by the optimality that the price is fixed at ρ,
and market shares in states (L,H) and (H,L) are fixed at q1LH = q
2
HL = 1. Each point in V (α) is
therefore established by varying market shares in ties, qiLL and q
i
HH . At an endpoint (u, u) of the
segment V (α), for example, firm 1 receives the smallest value u by being assigned to the least
favored market shares such that q1LL and q
1
HH are close or equal to zero. Attention is thus on
how to elicit a firm’s truthfulness at its “disadvantaged” position, where the firm may have zero
market share when it announces high cost. A high continuation value v1HL (as future reward) is
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aﬀorded to firm 1, in order to induce its truthfulness today at the market-share disadvantage in
ties. The level of future reward is determined by the binding On-ICiH in (15):
v1HL − v1LH =
(1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
. (22)
This equation is derived by adding up both sides of the binding On-ICiH :
24
2X
i=1
δ(viH − viL) =
2X
i=1
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
. (23)
Equation (22) implies that, if a line segment V (α) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently
long: the value u must exceed u by at least the RHS of (22).25 Only then is it feasible to reward
a high-cost firm with a high continuation value v1HL drawn from the segment. The on-schedule
constraints thus imply that there is an “additional” constraint:
u− u ≥ (1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
We now establish that there exists a vector z(α) that satisfies the binding On-ICiH and Add-IC
if for any δ,
α ≥ α∗(δ) ≡ 1− δ + δ(2μ− 1) (1− μγ)
1− δ + δ2μ2 , (24)
where γ represents the ratio 4ρ−θH .
To clarify the exposition, consider the case where α = α∗(δ) for any δ.26 Define a vector z(α)
such that (i) prices are fixed at ρ, (ii) market shares are allocated by productive eﬃciency with
q1LL = q
1
HH = 0 and (iii) continuation values are v
1
LH = v
1
HH = u,
v1HL = v
1
LH +
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
= u+
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
(25)
v1LL = u+
2μ− 1
μ
· (1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
, (26)
together with the condition, v1jk + v
2
jk = u+ u ∀(j, k). Using the expected equilibrium payoﬀ in
(19), let u1(z(α)) = u and u2(z(α)) = u. The vector z(α) then obtains the values at the endpoint:
u =
¡
μ− μ2α
¢
(ρ− θH) + μ(1− μ)4
1− δ (27)
u =
¡
1− μ+ μ2α
¢
(ρ− θH) + μ24
1− δ . (28)
Note that u decreases in α whereas u increases in α and that u+ u = ρ−E(θ)1−δ =
πm
1−δ for any α.
24The derivation of (22) is in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
25The length given by the RHS of (22) satisfies the required length for the segment to exist. If On-ICiH is not binding
(say, slack), then the width on the RHS is not long enough.
26We can show that for any α ≥ α∗(δ) given δ, there exist z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) that establishes the endpoint
(u, u¯). This result and the arguments that follow are detailed by the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
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The defined vector z(α) indicates that firm 1, at the endpoint (u, u), receives the least favored
market shares in ties, and produces zero output in (H,L). The binding On-ICiH in (22) implies
that firm 1 receives a high continuation value v1HL = u +
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
δ . This continuation-value
reward will be delivered when firm 1 takes more favored market shares in ties in the future after
the realization of (H,L). We confirm that the vector is (on-schedule) incentive compatible. The
value v1LL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC
1
H , and the value v
1
HL is chosen to satisfy equation
(23), given the other values. Thus, On-IC2H is also binding. It is followed by Lemma 2 that ∀i
if On-ICiH is binding, then On-IC
i
L is slack. We still need to confirm that Add-IC holds. The
level of α = α∗(δ) is determined to satisfy the binding Add-IC: u− u = (1−α)(ρ−θH)δ . Lastly, we
verify that the continuations are drawn from the value set [(u, u), (u, u)]. If Add-IC holds, then
u < v1HL ≤ u, and if μ > 12 , then u < v1LL < u.27 Hence, (v1jk, v2jk) ∈ V (α) ∀(j, k).
We next construct the other endpoint (u, u) of V (α). If there exists an incentive compatible
vector z(α) that establishes an endpoint (u, u), then there exists an analogous vector z0(α) that
establishes the other endpoint (u, u). The remainder of the segment can then be constructed by
a convex combination of two vectors. The reason is that, given the fixed price ρ, firms’ payoﬀs
and the on-schedule constraints are linear in terms of market shares and continuation values for
any level of α.
We now emphasize that the contract xi(α) can be used to lengthen the width of V (α). Observe
that the gap u−u increases in α. Indeed, the equilibrium payoﬀ in (19) changes with α under z(α).
When α rises, the payoﬀ of firm 2 (u) increases. The last term in (19) αμ(ρ− θH)(q2L− q2H) rises
with α, and this positive eﬀect is maximized for the most favored market shares, q2LL = q
2
HH = 1,
given the continuation values, v2LH = v
2
HH = u.
28 When α rises, however, the payoﬀ of firm 1
(u) falls. The positive eﬀect through the last term is minimized for firm 1 for the least favored
market shares, q1LL = q
1
HH = 0, and the continuation-value reward v
1
HL = v
1
LH+
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
δ falls,
given v1LH = u. For comparison with the contract x
i(α), consider an alternative contract xi(bα)
in which bα = bα(δ) > α∗(δ) for any δ. The associated vector z(bα) is defined such that productive
eﬃciency is achieved with q1LL = q
1
HH = 0, and continuation values are similar to those in z(α)
except that bα replaces α. We can then construct a value set V (bα) whose width is longer than
that of V (α) under α = α∗(δ). Since the RHS of Add-IC decreases in α, Add-IC is slack under
the alternative contract.
Our argument can be summarized as follows. Variations of continuation values are necessary
for firms to communicate truthfully and allocate market shares based on productive eﬃciency.
These continuation-value transfers are delivered in the form of market-share favors in ties (in
terms of favored locations on the segment). The Pareto frontier of APPE values can be es-
tablished only when the frontier is long enough. The frontier can be suﬃciently lengthened by
27Note that the assumption μ > 1
2
is necessary for (v1LL, v
2
LL) ∈ V (α).
28Letting market shares in ties q2LL = q
2
HH = q
2
T , the last term in (19) becomes αμ(ρ−θH)[(2μ−1)q2T+(1−μ)], which
increases in q2T if μ > 12 .
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Figure 1: Example of α = α∗(δ) and β = β∗(δ).
the contractual device, so that a high-cost firm at the least favored position is persuaded to be
truthful today by a continuation-value reward drawn from the frontier, even if the firm may end
up with zero market share. Given the recursive structure of the model, any collusive scheme
is designed to elicit firms’ truthfulness in each period, regardless of their previous cost reports.
Even after a history of 10 consecutive draws of (H,L), for example, firm 1 is induced to be truth-
ful today by the promise of the most favored market shares tomorrow, if it is patient enough to
endure asymmetric market shares in ties.
Lemma 3. Assume that μ > 12 and ρ ≥ CH and that firms are suﬃciently patient. If α ≥ α∗(δ),
there exists a set
V (α) =
©
(u1, u2) : ∃z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) such that ui = ui(z(α)) ∀i
ª
⊂ V m. (29)
A detailed proof is provided in the Appendix. An example of α = α∗ (δ) is in Fig. 1.
The level of α∗(δ) is decreasing in δ. If δ rises, then u − u rises but the RHS of Add-IC falls.
Intuitively, when firms are more patient and thus more willing to wait for future reward than
to capture the current-period gain from understatement, they may need a weaker contractual
commitment. The level of α∗(δ) is also decreasing in γ = 4ρ−θH . Intuitively, when 4 is higher,
high-cost firms are more willing to wait for future reward; when the continuation-value reward
is delivered in terms of market-share favors (e.g., qiLL = q
i
HH = 1), the payoﬀ will increase more
significantly for a higher 4. Firms may then need a weaker contractual commitment. On the
other hand, when the margin ρ− θH is higher, high-cost firms are more tempted to capture the
current-period gain; their incentives should thus be more strongly restricted by the contract.
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Consider next the parameter range ρ < CH in which q1HH + q
2
HH = 0 in an optimal collusion.
The contract xi(β) that corresponds to (11) and (12) becomes
ti
¡
qi, L
¢
= θLqi and (30)
ti
¡
qi,H
¢
= θHqi + β (ρ− θH) qi, (31)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. A high-cost firm produces zero output and ti
¡
qi, L
¢
has no information-rent
term. Any positive production is accomplished by either a low-cost firm or a high-cost firm that
is lying. If a high-cost firm lies and ever produces qi > 0, it gains (ρ− θH) qi but suﬀers costs
β (ρ− θH) qi. The binding On-ICiH implies that
v1HL − v1LH =
(1− β)(2− μ)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (32)
Thus, if a line segment V (β) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently long:
u− u ≥ (1− β)(2− μ)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
There is a vector z(β) that satisfies the binding On-ICiH and Add-IC if for any δ,
β ≥ β∗(δ) ≡ max
½
(2− μ) (1− δ + μδ)− μ2δγ
2− μ+ (3μ− 2) δ , 0
¾
. (33)
The same arguments as above lead to the following lemma.29
Lemma 4. Assume that μ > 3−
√
5
2 and ρ < CH and that firms are suﬃciently patient. If
β ≥ β∗(δ), there exists a set
V (β) =
©
(u1, u2) : ∃z(β) ∈ ZIC(V (β)) such that ui = ui(z(β)) ∀i
ª
⊂ V m. (34)
An example of β = β∗ (δ) is in Fig. 1. The level of β∗(δ) is decreasing in δ and γ; firms
may need a weaker contractual commitment when δ and γ are higher. The inequality ρ < CH
is rewritten as γ > 1−μμ . If γ is low and close to
1−μ
μ , then β
∗(δ) is higher than α∗(δ) given δ.
If γ keeps rising, then β∗(δ) shifts down below α∗(δ). If γ > 2−μμ and δ is suﬃciently high, then
β∗ (δ) = 0. The contractual commitment becomes unnecessary if γ and δ are suﬃciently high.
4.2 Optimal APPE with Assumption 1
In this subsection, we consider the oﬀ-schedule constraints. We find the critical discount factor
δ∗ above which the oﬀ-schedule constraints hold, using the above vector z(α).We first check the
oﬀ-schedule constraints of firm 1 at the market-share disadvantage, q1LL = q
1
HH = 0. Firm 1 will
not undercut the price after announcement (L,H) because of its current market share, q1LH = 1.
Firm 1 will not deviate after (H,L) if it does not deviate after (H,H), since the continuation
29The vector z(β) is detailed in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. The assumption μ > 1
2
is relaxed to μ >
3−
√
5
2
≈ 0.382. As above, this assumption is necessary for (v1LL, v2LL) ∈ V (β).
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value v1HL > v
1
HH , and the current market shares are the same, q
1
HL = q
1
HH = 0 in Oﬀ-IC
1
HL and
Oﬀ-IC1HH :
δ
¡
v1HL − v
¢
≥ ρ− θH − (ρ− θH) q1HL (35)
δ
¡
v1HH − v
¢
≥ ρ− θH − (ρ− θH) q1HH . (36)
Oﬀ-IC1LL is δ(v
1
LL − v) ≥ ρ − θL. We next check the oﬀ-schedule constraints of firm 2. Firm 2
will not deviate after (L,L) and (H,L) because of its current market share, q2LL = q
2
HL = 1.
Firm 2 will also not deviate after (L,H) and (H,H) if firm 1 does not deviate after (H,H),
since continuation value v2LH = v
2
HH > v
1
HH and the current market share for firm 1 at (H,H) is
zero, q1HH = 0. Hence, the oﬀ-schedule constraints are reduced to Oﬀ-IC
1
LL and Oﬀ-IC
1
HH . For
ρ ≥ CH , the two relevant constraints are
δ
µ
u+
2μ− 1
μ
· (1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
− v
¶
≥ ρ− θL (Oﬀ-IC1LL)
δ (u− v) ≥ ρ− θH . (Oﬀ-IC1HH)
As argued above, the contract xi(α) can be used to lengthen the width of V (α). Under an
alternative contract xi(bα), if bα = bα(δ) > α∗(δ) for any δ, then there exists a vector z(bα) in which
productive eﬃciency is achieved with q1LL = q
1
HH = 0, and continuation values are assigned as in
z(α) except that bα replaces α in continuation values. The width of the associated value set V (bα)
is longer than that of V (α) under α = α∗(δ). However, the values, v1LL and v
1
HH , are lower under
z(bα) than under z(α). Thus, lengthening the segment may be constrained by the disadvantaged
firm’s oﬀ-schedule incentive unless δ is suﬃciently high.
By contrast, the alternative contract xi(bα) may be used to shorten the width of the value set.
Under the contract xi(bα), there exists a vector bz(bα) 6= z(bα) such that productive eﬃciency is
achieved with q1LL = q
1
HH ∈ (0, 12), and continuation values remain the same as those under z(bα).
A distinct feature here is that firm 1’s market shares in ties are above zero and Add-IC is binding;
the level of bα = bα(δ) and market shares in ties are tailored to satisfy the binding Add-IC.30 The
width of the corresponding set V (bα) is then shorter than that of V (α) under α = α∗(δ). The
RHS of Oﬀ-IC1LL and Oﬀ-IC
1
HH decreases when the current market-share disadvantage in ties
decreases, while the value u in the LHS rises when the segment is shortened. Thus, shortening
the segment may serve to relax the oﬀ-schedule constraints in some parameter range. We now
summarize our findings.
Proposition 1. Assume that firms are suﬃciently patient. (i) If ρ ≥ CH and μ > 12 , then for
α ≥ α∗(δ), there exists a set V (α) ⊂ V m such that V (α) ∪ V n is a self-generating set of APPE
values. (ii) If ρ < CH and μ > 3−
√
5
2 , then for β ≥ β
∗(δ), there exists a set V (β) ⊂ V m such
that V (β) ∪ V n is a self-generating set of APPE values.
30 In the proof of Lemma 3, we show that for any α ≥ α∗(δ) given δ, there exists a vector z(α) in which On-ICiH and
Add-IC are binding.
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The proof is in the Appendix. The result shows that patient firms may benefit from the
interaction between contractual and market-sharing arrangements: the contract with agents
restricts the firms’ gain from understatement and allows firms to achieve productive eﬃciency
in their market-share allocations, and conversely, productive eﬃciency restricts the agents’ gain
from overstatement and reduces their information rents. This finding is, however, based on
Assumption 1.
4.3 Optimal APPE without Assumption 1
In this subsection, we relax Assumption 1, and construct the frontier of APPE values under a
payment scheme ti(qi, j) that is conditional only on the real quantity qi that agent i produces
after the report j. Given the potential diﬃculty with enforcing the contract in (11) and (12), we
put a restriction on market shares in ties: qiHH is held constant at
1
2 and only q
i
LL is used for
market-share favors. Assuming that ρ ≥ CH , we define a simple and enforceable contract xi(α):
ti
¡
qi, L
¢
= θLqi +
(1− μ)4
2
and (37)
ti
¡
qi,H
¢
=
(
θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ 12
θHqi + α (ρ− θH)
¡
qi − 12
¢
if qi > 12 .
(38)
Note that payments to agent i are conditional only on the actual output qi the agent produces.
The information-rent term is fixed, 4 · qiH = (1−μ)42 for qiHH = 12 . Any production above a fixed
output 12 is carried out by either a low-cost firm or a high-cost firm that is lying. The overall
expected information rents are μ(1− μ)4, as in the optimal monopoly contract. Following the
previous procedure, we can establish the existence of V (α) ⊂ V m under the contract if for any
δ,
α ≥ α∗ (δ) ≡ 1− δ + δμ (1− μγ)
1− δ + δμ (1 + μ) . (39)
We can also argue that the contract can be used to lengthen or shorten the width of V (α).
The rigidity, qiHH =
1
2 , limits the capacity of market-share favors to construct a long segment.
This may increase the contract’s role of lengthening the width of the segment. In fact, for δ > 0
and ρ ≥ CH (γ ≤ 1−μμ ), α∗(δ) in (39) is higher than in (24). At the same time, however, the
rigidity reduces a firm’s market-share disadvantage in ties and its expected gain from under-
statement. This relaxes the assumption on μ, which is necessary to make the continuation-value
reward suﬃcient for the firm at the current disadvantage.31 The assumption is relaxed to μ > 13 .
31 In the previous scheme where q1LL = q
1
HH = 0, if high cost is more likely than before (μ < 12 ), then firm
1’s understatement is more likely to increase its market share to q1LH = 1. Future reward with v
1
HL is then insuﬃcient;
to prevent firm 1’s understatement today, the scheme needs future penalty with v1LL below u (v
1
LL < u). The
rigidity, qiHH = 12 , reduces firm 1’s market-share disadvantage and its gains from understatement. Future reward with
v1HL is then suﬃcient; future penalty with v1LL < u is not necessary if μ is not too low (μ > 13 ).
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Proposition 2. Assume that firms are suﬃciently patient. If ρ ≥ CH and μ > 13 , then for
α ≥ α∗(δ) as in (39), there exists a set V (α) ⊂ V m such that V (α)∪ V n is a self-generating set
of APPE values.
The proof is in the Appendix. For ρ < CH , the result in Proposition 1 (ii) remains the
same; any modification of the contract in (30) and (31) is unnecessary, since the payments are
conditional only on the real output qi that agent i produces.
In the literature, firms take control of private information; thus, they can distort it at no extra
costs. In our model, the presence of agents is used by firms as a strategic opportunity to restrict
their incentives to distort private information. The result shows that such firm behavior may
expand the scope of optimal collusion: a very simple contractual device lengthens or shortens the
frontier of APPE values such that truthful communication of firms is ensured by continuation-
value transfers within the frontier. This argument becomes apparent in comparison with the no-
agent model. To characterize first-best collusion, Athey and Bagwell (2001) restrict γ = 4ρ−θH to
be above a certain level. As argued above, when γ falls, the need for the contractual commitment
increases. If this restriction fails in the no-agent model, then first-best profit is approximated
only when firms are infinitely patient; the frontier of APPE values elongates as firms becomes
more patient, but not suﬃciently for δ < 1. In this paper, however, the constraint on the width
of the frontier is relaxed even when firms are moderately patient.
5 Optimal SPPE
In this section, we analyze symmetric PPE (SPPE). In the analysis of APPE, market shares
in ties, qiLL and q
i
HH , are unrestricted as in Proposition 1, and q
i
LL is unrestricted and q
i
HH is
restricted to 12 as in Proposition 2. We now impose a symmetry restriction on market-shares in
ties: qiLL = q
i
HH =
1
2 . This symmetry undermines the capacity of market-share favors in ties and
may have a negative eﬀect on equilibrium values. In their no-agent model, Athey and Bagwell
(2001) show that firms may earn a lower profit in SPPE than in APPE. The objective of this
section is to show that the presence of agents may be used as a strategic opportunity to reduce
the potential disadvantage of SPPE.32
5.1 Symmetry Restriction
In this subsection, we specify what symmetry means. Recall that a strategy of firm i in period
τ is a mapping from the set of potential public histories to the set of stage-game strategies. A
32For other repeated games with private information in which SPPE is analyzed, see Athey et al. (2004), Bagwell
and Lee (2008), Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Hanazono and Yang (2007) and Lee (2007). Athey and Bagwell
(2008) show that the advantage of APPE may be significantly reduced when cost shocks are persistent: if demand is
inelastic and the distribution of types is log-concave, then a symmetric pooling equilibrium is optimal for patient firms
when cost types are perfectly persistent over time.
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typical strategy of firm i in period τ is σiτ (hτ ). In SPPE, firms follow the public history and
adopt symmetric strategies, σiτ (hτ ) = σ
j
τ (hτ ) ∀τ , hτ . This means that stage-game strategies are
symmetric across firms for all histories. Among the stage-game strategies we have used, only
strategies (p,q) are aﬀected by the symmetry restriction; contracts are symmetric, xi = xj , and
firms’ announcements are truthful in both APPE and SPPE. Thus, when ρ ≥ CH , an optimal
symmetric vector of (p,q) is given by
∀i, (j, k), pijk = ρ, q1LH = q2HL = 1, and qiLL = qiHH =
1
2
. (40)
Note that prices and market-share schedules are symmetric across firms. Because of symmetric
strategies, the corresponding SPPE-value set V s is restricted to the 45-degree line, and the Pareto
frontier is reduced to a point (bu, bu): V s ⊂ ©(u1, u2) : u1 = u2 ≤ buª .33
We next claim that symmetry is a real restriction in the no-agent model. The corresponding
On-IC1H is X
k∈{L,H}
£
μk (pHk − θH) q1Hk
¤
+ δv1H ≥
X
k∈{L,H}
£
μk(pLk − θH)q1Lk
¤
+ δv1L. (41)
On-IC2H is similarly given. On-IC
i
H implies that some eﬃciency loss necessarily occurs in the
current-period strategies (p,q) or in continuation values v. Pareto-eﬃcient continuation values
(vijk = bu) cause productive ineﬃciency (qiL = qiH) or price ineﬃciency (pjk < ρ for some (j, k)).
The eﬃcient current-period strategies (p,q) in (40) cause a reduction of some continuation values
below bu, which will be delivered in the form of eﬃciency loss in (p,q) in the future. Thus, optimal
SPPE values are lower than the corresponding optimal monopoly values.34
Lemma 5. In the no-agent model, optimal SPPE values are lower than the corresponding optimal
monopoly values.
5.2 Optimal SPPE Values
In this subsection, we show that a contractual arrangement xi(α) may be used to shorten the
SPPE-value set such that the potential disadvantage of SPPE decreases. We construct an SPPE-
value set V s(α) = [(u, u), (u, u)] where u > u. This set has the two endpoints of SPPE values,
(u, u) and (u, u), on the 45-degree line. If firms randomize over the two vectors that construct
the two respective endpoints, the SPPE-value set becomes convex and fully characterized. We
thus focus on the construction of the two endpoints. The set V s(α)∪ V n will be an SPPE-value
set if for any (u1, u2) ∈ V s(α), there exists a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V s(α)) such that ui = ui(z(α))
∀i.
33The value eu is the supremum of SPPE values. We will show below that the Pareto frontier of SPPE values includes
this supremum.
34Lemma 4 in Athey and Bagwell (2001) details how symmetry restricts the Pareto frontier.
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We first explore only the on-schedule constraints. Assuming that ρ ≥ CH , we define a contract
xi(α):35
ti
¡
qi, L
¢
= θLqi +
(1− μ)4
2
and (42)
ti
¡
qi,H
¢
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ 12
θHqi +
α(ρ−θH)
2(1−μ) if q
i > 12 .
(43)
Note that payments to agent i are conditional only on the actual output qi that the agent
produces. The information-rent term is fixed. Any production above a fixed output 12 is carried
out by either a low-cost firm or a high-cost firm that is lying. Following the vector (p,q) in (40),
a high-cost firm’s understatement makes the gain (ρ− θH)(qiL− qiH) =
ρ−θH
2 but incurs the extra
expense in (43) if its rival draws high cost. Thus, the binding On-ICiH becomes
δ
¡
viH − viL
¢
=
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
2
. (44)
A high-cost firm’s understatement thus makes the expected current gain (RHS) but entails the
expected future loss (LHS).
We now construct the endpoint (u, u) by using a symmetric vector z(α) in which (p,q) is the
vector in (40) and v is v1jk = v
2
jk = u ∀(j, k), except
v1LL = v
2
LL = u−
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
2δμ
. (45)
The level of viLL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC
i
H in (44). The vector z(α) uses the lower
continuation values (v1LL, v
2
LL) as future penalty to prevent the high-cost firm from understat-
ing its cost type today. This future penalty will be delivered to both firms subsequent to the
realization of (L,L). Equation (45) also implies that, if an SPPE-value set V s(α) exists, then
the distance between the two endpoints must be suﬃciently long (Add-IC): the value u must be
greater than u at least by (1−α)(ρ−θH)2δμ . Only then is it feasible to penalize low-cost firms with
(v1LL, v
2
LL) ∈ V s(α). Since On-ICiH is binding, the expected payoﬀ of firm i takes the same form
as (19). Letting ui(z(α)) = u, the vector z(α) yields
u =
ρ−E (θ)
2
+ δu− (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
2
. (46)
The last term represents the (discounted) potential future penalty that follows the realization of
(L,L).
We next construct the other endpoint (u, u) by using a vector z0(α) in which prices are fixed
at a lower level, pijk = ρ < ρ ∀i, (j, k), and (q,v) is the same as in the previous vector z(α).36
35There are other forms of contracts and associated vectors z(α) that can establish a SPPE-value set V s(α).
The qualitative result, however, would be unaﬀected.
36 In order to construct the point (u, u), firms may use a productive ineﬃciency rather than a price reduction.
An advantage of choosing the price reduction is that it reduces the incentive to undercut the price at the point.
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Following the vector z0(α), the future penalty (the lower continuation values) is delivered in the
form of the lower price ρ. With no prior assumption that On-ICiH is binding, the expected payoﬀ
under z0(α) is
ui(z0(α)) =
X
j{L,H}
μj
£¡
ρ− θj
¢
qij + δv
i
j
¤
− μ(1− μ)4
2
. (47)
The last term is the ex ante expected information rent for an agent. Letting ui(z0(α)) = u, the
vector z0(α) yields
u =
ρ−E (θ)
2
+ δu− (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
2
. (48)
The RHS captures the current-period price reduction (first term) and the switch to the higher
value u in the following period (second term) together with the potential future penalty (third
term). The level of ρ is now chosen to satisfy the binding Add-IC: u − u = (1−α)(ρ−θH)2δμ can be
rewritten as
ρ = ρ− (1− α) (ρ− θH)
μδ
. (49)
The binding Add-IC and (46) yield values:
u =
ρ−E (θ)− (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
2(1− δ) (50)
u = u− (1− α)(ρ− θH)
2δμ
. (51)
In the Appendix, a range of α is determined to ensure that z(α) and z0(α) satisfy the on-schedule
constraints; a certain level of α is necessary to prevent a low-cost firm i from overstating its cost
type to avoid the potential future penalty with viLL.
37
We finally consider the oﬀ-schedule constraints. Since firms are more tempted to undercut the
price ρ than ρ, we focus on the firm 1’s oﬀ-schedule incentive at (u, u). Firm 1 will not undercut
the price after announcement (L,H), since the current market share q1LH = 1. Firm 1 will be
more tempted to undercut the price after (H,L) than (H,H), since the current market share
q1HL < q
1
HH for the same continuation values, v
1
HL = v
1
HH = u. Hence, firm 1 will not undertake
any oﬀ-schedule deviation if
δ
¡
v1LL − v
¢
≥ (ρ− θL)q2LL =
ρ− θL
2
(Oﬀ-IC1LL)
δ
¡
v1HL − v
¢
≥ (ρ− θH)q2HL = ρ− θH . (Oﬀ-IC1HL)
The constraints are symmetric for firm 2. Thus, letting δ∗ = max{δ∗LL, δ∗HL}, we obtain the
result that corresponds to Lemma 3 in APPE: for some range of α and δ, there exist two vectors
that can establish (u, u) and (u, u), respectively, and the remainder of V s(α) can be constructed
by a convex combination of the two.
37See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
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We now emphasize that the contractual arrangement can be used to shorten the SPPE-value
set and oﬀset the disadvantage of SPPE. It immediately follows that, if α → 1, then ρ → ρ,
u→ u, u→ πm2(1−δ) and δ
∗ converges to the lowest level of δ that solves
δ
µ
πm
2(1− δ) −
πn
1− δ
¶
≥ max
½
ρ− θL
2
, ρ− θH
¾
. (52)
If α → 1 and δ > δ∗, then the width of V s(α) is shortened toward a point V m = {(u1, u2) :
u1 = u2 = π
m
2(1−δ)}. Intuitively, the contractual arrangement restricts the high-cost firm’s gain
from understatement today, which lowers the level of the future penalty with (v1LL, v
2
LL) that is
necessary to prevent the high-cost firm’s current understatement.
Proposition 3. Assume that ρ ≥ CH and that firms are suﬃciently patient. If α → 1, then
there exists a set V s(α) such that (i) V s(α)∪V n is a self-generating set of SPPE values and (ii)
V s(α)→ V m.
The result for ρ < CH is analogous. The symmetric scheme undermines the capacity of
market-share favors and restricts the Pareto frontier of equilibrium values to a point. Since future
reward with continuation values is not available, firms are more willing to opt for understatement
today. Thus, to approximate the frontier, SPPE requires a stronger commitment device than
APPE to restrict the gain from understatement. At the same time, however, the symmetric
scheme removes the assumption on μ that would otherwise be necessary to make the continuation-
value reward suﬃcient for the firm at the current market-share disadvantage in ties.
In SPPE, continuation-value transfers entail some waste of continuation values for both firms,
which will be delivered in the form of eﬃciency loss in prices or market-share allocations in
the future. In the no-agent model, continuation-value transfers are always wasteful and optimal
SPPE values fall short of the Pareto frontier of APPE values. In our model, the presence of
agents is used by firms as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private
information. We show that such firm behavior may oﬀset the disadvantage of SPPE and expand
the scope of optimal collusion: the SPPE-value set can be shortened to decrease the waste of
continuation values and approach a point in the Pareto frontier of APPE values.
6 Extensions
In this section, we informally present some possible extensions of the model.38 First, we extend
the model by assuming that firms can observe their own agents’ cost types. Second, we discuss
the role of communication between firms in comparison with other models. Third, we consider
internal contracting with agents who have future prospects.
38This section is motivated by referees’ reports.
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6.1 Firms with Private Information and Agents
In this subsection, we assume that firms can observe their agents’ cost types at no informational
costs: a firm’s production costs are privately observed by the firm and its agent. The model is
seemingly closer to the model of Athey and Bagwell (2001) than before. To establish an APPE-
value set, we use the contract in (37) and (38), except that ti
¡
qi, L
¢
has no information-rent
term: ti
¡
qi, L
¢
= θLqi and ti
¡
qi,H
¢
remains the same. As seen in the Appendix, our previous
analysis can be readily modified to show that for the same contractual range α ≥ α∗(δ) in (39),
the same incentive compatible vectors can establish an APPE-value set V (α). The contract can
also be used to lengthen or shorten the width of V (α). Hence, we can directly inherit the result
in Proposition 2 with some alterations: since firms do not incur information rents for agents, (i)
V (α) reaches the set of first-best values, V (α) ⊂ {(u1, u2) : u1 + u2 = ρ−E[min(θ1,θ2)]1−δ }, and (ii)
this result holds for ρ > θH and μ > 13 , where ρ > θH is our basic assumption. Likewise, as seen
in the Appendix, our previous analysis of SPPE can be extended to establish the corresponding
SPPE-value set.
Therefore, this extension serves to strengthen the main result: firms may be able to expand
the scope of optimal collusion by using the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to
lengthen the frontier of APPE values and shorten the SPPE-value set. In broad terms, the
contractual arrangement represents a public device that firms can use to endogenize the degree
to which they can distort private information. An equilibrium-value set may be tailored by such
a public device whether market-allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric.
6.2 Non-communicative Firms
The role of communication in the model is to achieve state-dependent market shares. Athey
and Bagwell (2001) show that, if past prices act as public history on which subsequent collusion
is coordinated, then first-best profit may be achieved without communication. Skrzypacz and
Hopenhayn (2004) find, however, that the scope of collusion is constrained without explicit com-
munication when firms have imperfect public monitoring on past actions. A potential benefit of
communication is also suggested in the private-monitoring literature. It would be very compli-
cated to keep track of each player’s belief over rival types as private information is accumulated
over time. Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) show that players, benefiting
from communication, can generate a public history on which future actions are coordinated.39
Returning to our model, we can show that the impact of non-communication on equilibrium
values may be arbitrarily small in the Bertrand model. As seen in Athey and Bagwell (2001),
small diﬀerences of prices across states can mimic the role of communication that allocates state-
39Recent work shows that the Folk Theorem seems quite robust in games with private monitoring (without commu-
nication) within the class of prisoner’s dilemma model (e.g., Sekiguchi, 1997; Bhaskar and Obara, 2002; and
Ely and Välimäki, 2002).
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contingent market shares and continuation values.40 For APPE, consider a price vector: p1H = ρ,
p1L = ρ − 2ε, p2H = ρ− ε and p2L = ρ − 3ε for arbitrarily small ε > 0, where pij denotes price of
firm i when its cost type is j. Prices and market shares correspond to the vector that we used
to construct the endpoint (u, u), and continuation values can be contingent on prices. Similarly,
for SPPE, select piH = ρ and p
i
L = ρ− ε to construct (u, u), and select piH = ρ and piL = ρ− ε to
construct (u, u).Market shares are symmetric and achieve productive eﬃciency in each endpoint,
and continuation values can be contingent on prices.
6.3 Non-myopic Agents
The contract with agents we have considered lasts for only one period. We now informally
present a possibility that the contract may be more eﬃcient if firms have a repeated contractual
relationship with their agents. The idea is that firms can reduce information rents for agents if
they can coordinate to oﬀer a contracting scheme that is conditional on the history of agents’
cost reports. Note that under productive eﬃciency, information rents for agent i are determined
by market shares at (H,H): 4 · qiH = (1− μ)4 · qiHH . We then link the market share at (H,H)
to the contractual form for agent i and j as follows: if qiHH = 1 and q
j
HH = 0, then contracts
are designed to aﬀord the maximized information rents (with qiHH = 1) to agent i and zero
information rents to agent j. An intertemporal contracting scheme is now employed to control
the agent i’s incentives to overstate, holding information rents for agent j at zero: if agent i in
its favored position reports low cost today, then the agent will preserve a favorable contract and
market share in (H,H) tomorrow, and if agent i reports high cost today, then the agent will lose
the advantage tomorrow (as future penalty) to agent j. In this way, patient firms can restrict
the favored agent’s current incentive to overstate its cost type with future penalty if agents care
about the future.41
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as
a strategic opportunity to expand the scope of optimal collusion. The contractual arrangement
with agents represents any public device that firms can use to adjust the degree to which they
can distort private information. We showed that an equilibrium-value set may be tailored by
such a public device whether market-allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric. We also
showed that our result can be readily extended to the model in which firms can observe their
agents’ cost types at no informational costs.
40For detail, see their Proposition 8. Athey and Bagwell (2001) also address the circumstances where firms
benefit from non-communication.
41For more discussion, see my working paper, Lee (2008).
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Appendix
Two-Tier Mechanism Design Program: In Step 1, we assume that each firm knows its
agent’s cost type for a given contract. Then, following Abreu et al. (1986, 1990), any public
equilibrium play can be factored into current-period strategies and continuation values drawn
from the convex hull of the set V . This “factored” program chooses current-period strategies
s ∈ S and continuation-value function υ : {L,H}2 ×R4 → co(V ) to maximize
ui = Eθi
£
Πi(s) + δυi (s(θ))
¤
subject to: for firms i and j, and any deviation bsi = (bai, bpi, bqi) ∈ Si,
Eθi
£
Πi(s) + δυi (s(θ))
¤
≥ Eθi
£
Πi
¡bsi, sj¢+ δυi ¡bsi(θi,eaj(θj)), sj(θj ,bai(θi))¢¤ .
Continuation-value function υ is conditional on two firms’ announcement and current-period
strategies (p,q). Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that the PPE-value set in the factored program
can be equally established by the mechanism design program (Step 1). The two-tier program we
adopt consists of two steps:
Step 1 (Mechanism Design Program): Assume that for a given contract, each firm knows
its agent’s cost type (each agent makes truthful report (ri = θi)). The program chooses current-
period strategies (p,q) : {L,H}2 → R4 and continuation-value function v : {L,H}2×R4 → co(V )
to maximize the ex ante expected payoﬀ
ui(z) =
X
j∈{L,H}
μj
£
Πi (j, j) + δvij
¤
subject to:
(i) On-Schedule Constraints: ∀jˆ 6= j, vijˆk ∈ co(V ),
Πi (j, j) + δvij ≥ Πi (jˆ, j) + δvijˆ. (On-ICij)
(ii) Oﬀ-Schedule Constraints: ∀(cpjk, cqjk) /∈ {(pijk, qijk)}, bv ∈ co(V ),
πi
¡
pijk, q
i
jk, j
¢
+ δvijk ≥ πi (cpjk, cqjk, j) + δbv. (Oﬀ-ICijk)
(iii) Oﬀ-Schedule Constraints: ∀(cpjˆk,cqjˆk) /∈ {(p1jk, q1jk)}, bv ∈ co(V ),
Π1 (j, j) + δv1j ≥
X
k{L,H}
μk
£
π1 (cpjˆk,cqjˆk, j) + δbv¤ . (Oﬀ-m-IC1j)
The constraint Oﬀ-m-IC2k is analogous.
Step 2 (Choice of Contract): Letting ui(z(xi)) represent the ex ante expected payoﬀ under
a contract xi, we find a contract xi that satisfies
(i) Agent’s Truthful Reports: ri = θi.
(ii) Optimality Condition: for any alternative contract bx, ui(z(xi)) ≥ ui(z(bx)). ¥
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Proof of Lemma 2. Given the contract defined in (11) and (12) and the fixed price ρ, the
interim-stage profits for firm i are
U i(H,H) = (ρ− θH)qiH + δviH
U i(L,H) = (ρ− θH)qiL − α(ρ− θH)(qiL − qiH) + δviL
U i(L,L) = (ρ− θL)qiL −4 · qiH + δviL
U i(H,L) = (ρ− θL)qiH −4 · qiH + δviH .
Before we prove Lemma 2, we first show that a weak monotonicity, qiL ≥ qiH , is a necessary feature
of equilibrium, implied by the on-schedule constraints, U i(H,H) ≥ U i(L,H) and U i(L,L) ≥
U i(H,L). The on-schedule constraints imply
U i(H,H)− U i(H,L) ≥ U i(L,H)− U i(L,L).
This inequality is equivalent to
4 · ¡qiL − qiH¢+ α(ρ− θH)(qiL − qiH) ≥ 0. (A1)
Hence, the weak monotonicity is necessarily satisfied in equilibrium.
We next prove Lemma 2. The binding On-ICiH implies that
U i(H,H) = U i(L,H) = (ρ− θH)qiL − α(ρ− θH)(qiL − qiH) + δviL.
It then follows by (A1) that
U i(L,L)− U i(H,H) = U i(L,L)− U i(L,H)
= 4 · ¡qiL − qiH¢+ α(ρ− θH)(qiL − qiH) ≥ 0.
Lastly, we show that U i(H,H) equals U i(H,L):
U i(H,L) = (ρ− θL)qiH −4 · qiH + δviH
= (ρ− θH)qiH + δviH = U i(H,H).
Hence, U i(L,L) ≥ U i(H,L) ∀α. Further, if qiL > qiH holds as in the optimal collusion, then
U i(L,L) > U i(H,L) ∀α. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Before we establish the existence of V (α) ⊂ V m, we derive equation
(22), which is a necessary feature implied by the the binding On-ICiH . Adding the two binding
On-ICiH yields
δ
2X
i=1
(viH − viL) = (1− α)(ρ− θH)
2X
i=1
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
. (A2)
The LHS of (A2) is
δ
£
μ(v1HL − v1LL) + (1− μ)(v1HH − v1LH) + μ(v2LH − v2LL) + (1− μ)(v2HH − v2HL)
¤
= δ
£
μ(v1HL − v1LL) + (1− μ)(v1HH − v1LH) + μ(v1LL − v1LH) + (1− μ)(v1HL − v1HH)
¤
= δ
£
v1HL − v1LH
¤
.
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The first equality transforms the continuation values for firm 2 into the ones for firm 1; since
continuation values are drawn from V (α) = [(u, u), (u, u)], we can show that
v2LH − v2LL = v1LL − v1LH and v2HH − v2HL = v1HL − v1HH .
A simplification confirms the second equality. The RHS of (A2) becomes
μ
¡
q1LL + q
2
LL
¢
+ (1− μ)
¡
q1LH + q
2
HL
¢
− μ
¡
q1HL + q
2
LH
¢
− (1− μ)
¡
q1HH + q
2
HH
¢
= 1.
Hence, (A2) boils down to
v1HL − v1LH =
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (A3)
Thus, if V (α) exists, then its width must be at least as long as the RHS:
u− u ≥ (1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
We hereafter establish the existence of V (α). To this end, we first construct an endpoint (u, u)
of a segment V (α). Consider a vector z(α):
z(α) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
pijk = ρ,
q1LL = q
1
HH = q
1
T (q
2
LL = q
2
HH = q
2
T ),
q1LH = q
2
HL = 1 (q
1
HL = q
2
LH = 0),
v1LH = v
1
HH = u (v
2
LH = v
2
HH = u).
(A4)
The term qiT represents the firm i’s market share when two firms tie as in (L,L) and (H,H), and
q1T + q
2
T = 1. The continuation values, v
1
HL and v
1
LL, are not specified yet, and will be defined
below. If On-ICiH ∀i is binding, then the firm’s expected payoﬀ is
ui(z(α)) = (ρ− θH) qiH + μ4 ·
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
+ αμ(ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
+ δviH . (A5)
Using the vector z(α) in (A4), we find the values, u and u, in the self-generating set. Letting
u1 = u in (A5), we can find
u = (ρ− θH)[1− μ+ μα(2μ− 1)]q1T +4μ(2μ− 1)q1T (A6)
+ (ρ− θH)μ(1− μ)α+4μ(1− μ) + δ
£
μv1HL + (1− μ)v1HH
¤
.
We rearrange the last continuation-value terms:
δ
£
μv1HL + (1− μ)v1HH
¤
= δ
∙
μv1LH +
μ(1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
+ (1− μ)v1HH
¸
= δu+ μ(1− α)(ρ− θH).
The first equality holds because of (A3) and the second equality comes from (A4). Plugging this
into (A6), we can get
(1− δ)u = (ρ− θH) [1− μ+ μα(2μ− 1)] q1T +4μ(2μ− 1)q1T (A7)
+ (ρ− θH)μ(1− μα) +4μ(1− μ).
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Likewise, letting u2 = u in (A5), we can find
(1− δ)u = (ρ− θH) [1− μ+ μα(2μ− 1)] q2T +4μ(2μ− 1)q2T (A8)
+ (ρ− θH)μ(1− μ)α+4μ(1− μ).
Note that the line segment V (α) ⊂ V m: u+ u = ρ−E(θ)1−δ =
πm
1−δ ∀α.
We next look for the range of α in which the constraint Add-IC is satisfied. We claim that
the constraint Add-IC is binding,
u− u = (1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
, (A9)
if and only if
q1T =
1
2
−
(1− α)
¡
μ+ 1−δδ
¢
2(1− μ) + 2μ(2μ− 1) (α+ γ) . (A10)
To prove this, we plug (A7) and (A8) into (A9), recollecting q2T = 1− q1T and γ = 4/(ρ− θH).
If firm 1 is in the least favored position (q1T = q
1
LL = q
1
HH = 0), then we can get
α∗(δ) ≡ 1− δ + δ(2μ− 1) (1− μγ)
1− δ + δ2μ2 . (A11)
It follows by (A10) that (i) if α = α∗(δ), then q1T = 0, (ii) if α
∗(δ) < α < 1, then 0 < q1T <
1
2 and
(iii) if α = 1, then q1T =
1
2 . Hence, for any α ≥ α∗(δ) for a given δ, there exists a vector z(α) in
which Add-IC is binding.
We next verify that all the continuation values are drawn from V (α). By the vector z(α), all
the continuation values are in V (α) except v1HL and v
1
LL, which are not specified by z(α) in (A4).
We thus need to prove that, given z(α), v1HL and v
1
LL are also drawn from V (α): u ≤ v1HL ≤ u
and u ≤ v1LL ≤ u. Recall that the continuation value v1HL is determined to satisfy (A2):
v1HL = v
1
LH +
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
= u+
(1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
≤ u. (A12)
The last inequality comes from Add-IC. If q1T is chosen as in (A10), then Add-IC is binding as
in (A9) and
v1HL = u+
(1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
= u.
Thus, if Add-IC is binding, then v1HL = u, and if Add-IC is slack, then u < v
1
HL < u. The
continuation value v1LL is determined to satisfy the binding On-IC
1
H :
v1LL = u+
2μ− 1
μ
· (1− α) (ρ− θH)
¡
1− q1T
¢
δ
. (A13)
Given the assumption μ > 12 , u ≤ v1LL ≤ u. Hence, (v1jk, v2jk) ∈ V (α) ∀(j, k).
We now prove that all the on-schedule constraints are satisfied. On-IC1H is binding, since v
1
LL
is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC1H . Given that v
1
HL is chosen to satisfy (A2), we can confirm
that On-IC2H also is binding:
δ(v2H − v2L) = (1− α)(ρ− θH)
¡
q2L − q2H
¢
= (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
£
(2μ− 1)q2T + (1− μ)
¤
.
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Under z(α), the RHS of On-IC2H can be rewritten as the second equality, and the LHS is
δ
£
μv2LH + (1− μ)v2HH − μv2LL − (1− μ)v2HL
¤
= (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
£
(2μ− 1)q2T + (1− μ)
¤
.
The values, v2LL and v
2
HL, are given by (A12), (A13) and the condition, v
1
jk+ v
2
jk = u+u ∀(j, k).
Thus, On-IC2H is binding. We then invoke Lemma 2 to show that, since On-IC
i
H ∀i is binding,
On-ICiL ∀i is slack. Hence, all the on-schedule constraints are satisfied.
Until now, we have found that for α ≥ α∗(δ), there exists a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) that
establishes the endpoint (u, u). Letting z0(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) denote an analogous vector that
implements the other endpoint, the remainder of the segment can be established with the convex
combination of z(α) and z0(α). This is possible, since for any α, firms’ payoﬀs and the on-schedule
constraints are linear in terms of market shares and continuation values.
Lastly, we show that Add-IC can be slack in the range {(δ, α) : α∗(δ) < α ≤ 1}. To this end,
consider the vector z(α) in which Add-IC is binding under α = α∗(δ) for a given δ. Then, this
vector z(α) specifies q1T = 0 as in (A10). The values in (A7) and (A8) become
u =
¡
μ− μ2α
¢
(ρ− θH) + μ(1− μ)4
1− δ
u =
¡
1− μ+ μ2α
¢
(ρ− θH) + μ24
1− δ .
For an alternative contract xi(bα), where bα = bα(δ) > α∗(δ) for a given δ, define a vector z(bα) in
which q1T = 0 is preserved and continuation values are assigned as in z(α) except that bα replaces
α in v1HL and v
1
LL. Then, it follows that the vector z(bα) (along with z0(bα)) can establish the
value set V (bα) whose width is longer than the width of V (α), since u is higher and u lower underbα = bα(δ) than under α = α∗(δ). On the other hand, the RHS of Add-IC is lower under bα = bα(δ)
than under α = α∗(δ):
(1− bα) (ρ− θH)
δ
<
(1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
.
Hence, Add-IC is slack. Note that when Add-IC is slack, v1HL = u+
(1−eα)(ρ−θH)
δ < u. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. To establish the existence of V (α) and V (β), the proof focuses
on the two vectors z(α) and z(β) when α = α∗(δ) and β = β∗(δ), respectively. In these cases,
q1T = 0. Suppose first that ρ ≥ CH . To establish an endpoint (u, u) of a segment V (α), define a
vector z(α):
z(α) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pijk = ρ
q1LL = q
1
HH = 0 (q
2
LL = q
2
HH = 1)
q1LH = q
2
HL = 1 (q
1
HL = q
2
LH = 0)
v1LH = v
1
HH = u (v
2
LH = v
2
HH = u).
(A14)
It is shown by the proof of Lemma 3 that (i) all the on-schedule constraints and Add-IC are
satisfied and (ii) (v1jk, v
2
jk) ∈ V (α) ∀(j, k). It thus suﬃces to prove that the oﬀ-schedule constraints
(Oﬀ-IC) are satisfied. As argued in Section 4.2, we can restrict attention to the Oﬀ-IC of firm
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1 that is the least favored position at the endpoint (u, u). Because 4 · q1H = 0 under z(α), the
associated oﬀ-schedule constraints are
δ(v1LL − v) ≥ ρ− θL − (ρ− θL) q1LL (Oﬀ-IC1LL)
δ(v1LH − v) ≥ ρ− θL − (ρ− θL) q1LH (Oﬀ-IC1LH)
δ(v1HL − v) ≥ ρ− θH − (ρ− θH) q1HL (Oﬀ-IC1HL)
δ(v1HH − v) ≥ ρ− θH − (ρ− θH) q1HH (Oﬀ-IC1HH)
Because q1LL = q
1
HL = q
1
HH = 0 and q
1
H = 0 under z(α), Oﬀ-IC
1
LH is slack and Oﬀ-IC
1
HL is
implied by Oﬀ-IC1HH . Thus, the oﬀ-schedule constraints are reduced to Oﬀ-IC
1
LL and Oﬀ-IC
1
HH :
δ(v1LL − v) ≥ ρ− θL and δ(v1HH − v) ≥ ρ− θH .
The values v1LL and v
1
HH are
v1LL = u+
2μ− 1
μ
· (1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
and
v1HH = u =
¡
μ− μ2α
¢
(ρ− θH) + μ(1− μ)4
1− δ .
Plugging the values together with α = α∗(δ) into two inequalities, we can get δ∗LL and δ
∗
HH . The
critical discount factor is δ∗ = max{δ∗LL, δ∗HH}.
Suppose next that ρ < CH . For β = β∗(δ), define a vector z(β):
z(β) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pijk = ρ
q1LH = q
2
HL = q
2
LL = 1
q1HH = q
2
HH = 0
v1LH = v
1
HH = u (v
2
LH = v
2
HH = u).
(A15)
Equation (A2) boils down to
v1HL − v1LH =
(1− β)(2− μ)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (A16)
Thus, if a line segment V (β) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently long:
u− u ≥ (1− β)(2− μ)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
The value v1HL is assigned to satisfy (A16):
v1HL = v
1
LH +
(1− β)(2− μ)(r − θH)
δ
= u+
(1− β)(2− μ)(r − θH)
δ
. (A17)
The value v1LL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC
1
H :
v1LL = u+
3μ− μ2 − 1
μ
· (1− β)(r − θH)
δ
. (A18)
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If On-ICiH ∀i is binding, then the firm’s expected payoﬀ takes the same form as (A5). Letting
u1 = u and u2 = u, the vector z(β) yields
u =
[μ(2− μ)− μβ] (ρ− θH) + μ(1− μ)4
1− δ
u =
μβ(r − θH) + μ4
1− δ .
Note that u decreases in β whereas u increases in β and that u+ u = [1−(1−μ)
2](ρ−θL)
1−δ =
πm
1−δ ∀β.
We now confirm that all the constraints hold. If Add-IC holds, then u < v1HL ≤ u, and if
μ > 3−
√
5
2 , then u < v
1
LL < u. Hence, (v
1
jk, v
2
jk) ∈ V (β) ∀(j, k). Because of the binding On-IC1H
and (A2), On-IC2H is binding. By Lemma 2, if On-IC
i
H is binding, then On-IC
i
L is slack. Lastly,
the level of β = β∗(δ) is determined to satisfy Add-IC: β ≥ β∗(δ) as defined by (33) in the main
text. If the first term in max{·, ·} is positive, then Add-IC is binding, and if it is negative, then
Add-IC is slack. Hence, z(β) satisfies all the on-schedule constraints and constructs the endpoint
(u, u). The remainder of V (β) is constructed by a convex combination of two analogous vectors.
The previous arguments directly hold: when β rises, the width of V (β) is lengthened. As above,
the relevant oﬀ-schedule constraints are Oﬀ-IC1LL and Oﬀ-IC
1
HH :
δ
¡
v1LL − v
¢
≥ ρ− θL and δ
¡
v1HH − v
¢
≥ ρ− θH .
Substituting the continuation values in (A17) and (A18) together with β = β∗(δ), we can get
δ∗ = max{δ∗LL, δ∗HH}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. We here focus on the case of α = α∗ (δ) for any δ. The extension
to the case of α > α∗ (δ) follows the previous proof. To establish an endpoint (u, u) of a segment
V (α), consider a vector z(α):
z(α) ≡
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pijk = ρ
q1LH = q
2
HL = q
2
LL = 1
q1HH = q
2
HH =
1
2
v1LH = v
1
HH = u (v
2
LH = v
2
HH = u).
(A19)
Given this vector, (A2) becomes
v1HL − v1LH =
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (A20)
Thus, if V (α) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently long:
u− u ≥ (1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
The continuation value v1HL is chosen to satisfy (A20):
v1HL = u+
(1− α) (ρ− θH)
δ
(A21)
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The continuation value v1LL is determined to satisfy the binding On-IC
1
H :
v1LL = u+
3μ− 1
2μ
· (1− α)(ρ− θH)
δ
. (A22)
If On-ICiH ∀i is binding, then the firm’s expected payoﬀ takes the same form as (A5). Letting
u1 = u and u2 = u, the vector z(α) yields
u =
[1 + μ− μ (1 + μ)α] (ρ− θH) + μ(1− μ)4
2(1− δ)
u =
[1− μ+ μ (1 + μ)α] (ρ− θH) + μ (1 + μ)4
2(1− δ) .
Note that u+ u = ρ−E(θ)1−δ ∀α and that the value u increases in α but u decreases in α. We next
show that all the constraints are satisfied. If Add-IC holds, then u < v1HL ≤ u, and if μ > 13 ,
then u < v1LL < u. Hence, (v
1
jk, v
2
jk) ∈ V (α) ∀(j, k). Because of the binding On-IC1H and (A2),
On-IC2H is binding. By Lemma 2, On-IC
i
L is slack. The level of α = α
∗(δ) is determined to
satisfy the binding Add-IC:
α∗ (δ) ≡ 1− δ + δμ (1− μγ)
1− δ + δμ (1 + μ) . (A23)
Hence, if α = α∗(δ), there exists the vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) that can establish the endpoint
(u, u) . The remainder of the segment can be established by convex combination of z(α) and
z0(α). Consider next the oﬀ-schedule constraints. The relevant oﬀ-schedule constraints are
δ
¡
v1LL − v
¢
≥ ρ− θL − (ρ− θL) q1LL (Oﬀ-IC1LL)
δ
¡
v1HH − v
¢
≥ ρ− θH − (ρ− θH) q1HH (Oﬀ-IC1HH)
δ
¡
v1HL − v
¢
≥ ρ− θH − (ρ− θH) q1HL (Oﬀ-IC1HL)
Given the above continuation values, q1LL = q
1
HL = 0 and q
1
HH =
1
2 under z(α), it is immediate
that Oﬀ-IC1LL implies Oﬀ-IC
1
HL since v
1
HL > v
1
LL for all μ >
1
3 . The constraints are reduced to
Oﬀ-IC1LL and Oﬀ-IC
1
HH . Substituting the continuation values together with α = α
∗(δ), we can
find δ∗ = max{δ∗LL, δ∗HH}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. We confirm that the vector z(α) satisfies the on-schedule con-
straints. The value viLL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC
i
H . If On-IC
i
H is binding, then
On-ICiL is slack by Lemma 2. Add-IC is satisfied by the choice of ρ. Because of the binding
Add-IC, viLL in (45) becomes
viLL = u−
(1− α)(ρ− θH)
2δμ
= u.
Thus, all the continuation values are drawn from V s(α): vijk = u ∀i, (j, k) except viLL = u. We
can also verify that z0(α) satisfies the on-schedule constraint. Under z0(α), On-ICiH becomes
δ(viH − viL) ≥ (ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
− (1− μ)α (ρ− θH)
2(1− μ) .
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Given the above continuation values, the LHS boils down to δμ(u−u) = (1−α)(ρ−θH)2 . A simplifi-
cation shows that On-ICiH becomes ρ ≥ ρ. Thus, as indicated by (49), On-ICiH is slack (binding)
if 0 ≤ α < 1 (if α = 1). Under z0(α), On-ICiL becomes
δ(viH − viL) ≤ (ρ− θL)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
.
This can be rearranged as (1− α)(ρ− θH) ≤ ρ− θL. If α rises, then the LHS falls, whereas the
RHS rises because the price ρ in (49) rises. This inequality is reduced to
α ≥ α∗(δ) ≡ max
½
1− μδ
1 + μδ
µ
ρ− θL
ρ− θH
¶
, 0
¾
. (A24)
Hence, the vectors z(α) and z0(α) satisfy the on-schedule constraints if α ≥ α∗(δ) in (A24). This
range of α is necessary to reduce the low-cost firm’s incentive to overstate its cost type and avoid
the potential future penalty. ¥
Firms with Private Information and Agents. Consider first APPE. Following the proof
of Proposition 2, we find a contract xi(α) under which a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) establishes an
endpoint (u, u) ∈ V (α). The contract is defined by (37) and (38) in the text, except that ti(qi, L)
has no information-rent term, ∆ · qiH . If On-ICiH ∀i is binding, then the expected payoﬀ is
ui(z(α)) = (ρ− θH) qiH + μ4 · qiL + αμ(ρ− θH)
¡
qiL − qiH
¢
+ δviH . (A25)
The vector z(α) is defined by (A19). Given this vector, equation (A2) becomes v1HL − v1LH =
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
δ . Thus, if V (α) ⊂ V m exists, then u− u ≥
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
δ (Add-IC). The choice of v
1
HL
and v1LL is given by (A21) and (A22). Letting u
1 = u and u2 = u, the vector z(α) yields
u =
[1 + μ− μ(1 + μ)α](ρ− θH) + 2μ(1− μ)4
2(1− δ)
u =
[1− μ+ μ(1 + μ)α](ρ− θH) + 2μ4
2(1− δ) .
Note that u + u = ρ−E[min(θ
1,θ2)]
1−δ ∀α and that u increases in α but u decreases in α. The level
of α = α∗(δ) is determined to satisfy the binding Add-IC and turns out to be the same as in
(A23). All remaining proofs for the on- and oﬀ-schedule constraints correspond to the proofs in
Proposition 2.
Consider next SPPE and construct an SPPE-value set V s(α) = [(u, u), (u, u)]. Following
the proof of Proposition 3, we find a contract xi(α) under which a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V s(α))
establishes (u, u) and another vector z0(α) ∈ ZIC(V s(α)) establishes (u, u). The contract is
defined by (42) and (43) in the text, except ti(qi, L) = θLqi. Under this contract, the binding
On-ICiH becomes δ(v
i
H − viL) =
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
2 . We construct (u, u) by using z(α) in which (p,q)
is (40) in the text, and v1jk = v
2
jk = u ∀(j, k), except that viLL is chosen to satisfy the binding
On-ICiH : v
1
LL = v
2
LL = u −
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
2δμ . Thus, if V
s(α) exists, then it must be suﬃciently long
(Add-IC). Since On-ICiH is binding, the expected payoﬀ is given by (A25). Letting u
i(z(α)) = u,
z(α) yields
u =
ρ−E[min(θ1, θ2)]
2
+ δu− (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
2
.
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We next construct (u, u) by using z0(α) in which pijk = ρ < ρ ∀i, (j, k) and other vectors are the
same as in z(α). With no prior assumption that On-ICiH is binding, the expected payoﬀ of firm
i becomes
ui(z0(α)) =
X
j{L,H}
μj
£
(ρ− θj) qij + δvij
¤
.
Letting ui(z0(α)) = u, z0(α) yields
u =
ρ−E[min(θ1, θ2)]
2
+ δu− (1− α)μ(ρ− θH)
2
.
The level of ρ is chosen to satisfy the binding Add-IC: ρ = ρ− (1−α)(ρ−θH)μδ . Hence, by replacing
E(θ) by E[min(θ1, θ2)] in (50) and (51), we can find the equilibrium values, u and u. All remaining
proofs for the on- and oﬀ-schedule constraints correspond to the proofs in Proposition 3. ¥
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